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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                        
 
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge. 
 
     Plaintiff Martha A. Miller filed a 42 U.S.C.  1983 action 
for malicious prosecution against numerous defendants after a 
motion by the state to nolle prosequi her criminal charges was 
granted.  The motion to nolle prosequi her charges resulted from 
a compromise between the District Attorney's Office and her 
common law husband, John Hilfirty, who was arrested with her.  
Pursuant to this compromise, Hilfirty agreed to enter an 
Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition ("ARD") program in 
exchange for dismissal of the charges against him and for the 
motion to nolle prosequi the charges against Miller. 
     The district court reviewing Miller's malicious prosecution 
claim granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the 
ground that Miller failed to make out a prima facie case of 
malicious prosecution because she was unable to meet the 
threshold requirement of demonstrating that the criminal charges 
against her were terminated favorably.   
     We conclude that a grant of nolle prosequi is insufficient 
to support a claim of malicious prosecution only in circumstances 
where the accused herself enters into a compromise with the 
prosecution in which she surrenders something of value to obtain 
the dismissal or where the accused formally accepts the grant of 
nolle prosequi in exchange for her knowing, voluntary release of 
any future claims for malicious prosecution.  Because we find 
that Miller neither compromised with the prosecution to obtain 
her grant of nolle prosequi nor formally accepted the nolle 
prosequi in exchange for a release of future civil claims, we 
conclude that the underlying proceeding terminated in her favor 
for purposes of sustaining a malicious prosecution claim, and 
accordingly, we reverse as to the dismissal of the malicious 
prosecution claim. 
 
                                I. 
     John Hilfirty was terminated from his position as a general 
manager of a recycling center operated by the Lycoming Valley 
Association for the Deaf (LVAD) on May 7, 1991.  His termination 
followed the deterioration of his relationship with the Chairman 
of the LVAD Board, Betty Noll, due to a dispute regarding the 
alleged misuse of some of LVAD's funds.  According to the 
complaint filed by Hilfirty and Miller before the district court, 
Noll was involved in the mishandling of funds, and she had become 
frustrated with Hilfirty's refusal to participate in her scheme. 
     Hilfirty fought against his termination and applied for 
unemployment compensation, which LVAD contested.  Hilfirty 
alleged that during the course of his unemployment compensation 
hearing a series of events transpired which led some of the LVAD 
Board members to participate in a conspiracy with county law 
enforcement authorities to have criminal charges filed against 
Hilfirty and Miller, his common law wife, in order to try to ruin 
Hilfirty's reputation.  In particular, Hilfirty claimed that 
several LVAD Board members supplied false information to the 
prosecutor's office that Hilfirty had secretly recorded LVAD 
Board meetings and telephone conversations with LVAD Board 
members in violation of Pennsylvania's wire-tapping statute. As a 
result of this information, a search warrant was issued for the 
premises of the house shared by Hilfirty and Miller.  The search 
warrant identified the items to be searched for and seized to be 
"[e]lectronical [sic], mechanical, or other device as defined in 
Pa. Crimes Code 5702 Tape Recordings (Audio or Visual) and 
transcripts, notes pertaining to illegal intercepts."  Appellee 
Appendix at 13. 
     In the course of the ensuing search, several items were 
seized from the house, including cassette tapes, recorders, a 
small amount of illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia including 
pipes, bongs, and rolling paper.  As a result of this seizure, 
the District Attorney's Office filed criminal complaints against 
both Hilfirty and Miller, who were arrested as a result.  
Hilfirty was charged with five counts of violating the 
Pennsylvania wire-tapping statute, one count of possession of an 
electronic device capable of illicitly intercepting verbal 
communications, one count of criminal conspiracy, one count of 
possession of a controlled substance, and one count of possession 
of drug paraphernalia.  Miller was charged with one count of 
criminal conspiracy to intercept oral communications, one count 
of violation of the Pennsylvania wire-tapping statute, one count 
of possession of drug paraphernalia, and one count of possession 
of a controlled substance.  
     Hilfirty and Miller were released on their own recognizance, 
and their cases were consolidated for trial.  In the course of 
preparing for trial, Hilfirty and Miller filed a motion to 
suppress the evidence seized during the search on the ground that 
probable cause for issuing the warrant was lacking.  Their motion 
was denied. 
     In June of 1992, the District Attorney's Office approached 
Hilfirty's counsel, suggesting that Hilfirty's case be disposed 
of through the ARD program, whereby the charges against Hilfirty 
would be dismissed if he agreed to certain terms, including 
probation for one year, payment of the costs of the prosecution, 
payment of a $250 administrative fee, payment of the costs of 
supervision, performance of 32 hours of community service, and 
the withdrawal of private criminal complaints he had filed 
against defendants Noll and Shipman.  After some negotiations, 
Hilfirty agreed to enter the ARD program on the condition that 
the District Attorney's Office would file a motion to nolle 
prosequi the charges against Miller.  Accordingly, Hilfirty 
signed, and the court approved, a document through which he 
entered the ARD program.  On the same day, the Court of Common 
Pleas of Lycoming County also separately issued an order granting 
the Commonwealth's Motion to Nolle Prosequi the charges against 
Miller.  Miller did not sign any documents accepting the grant of 
nolle prosequi. 
     According to two affidavits by attorneys from the District 
Attorney's Office which were presented by defendants to the 
district court in the instant civil action, counsel for both 
Hilfirty and Miller were present at these negotiations.  Miller 
presented no evidence to the contrary before the district court, 
although she asserts on appeal that she neither initiated these 
negotiations nor participated in any of these discussions 
herself.  Rather, she avers that during these discussions 
Hilfirty's counsel alone agreed that Hilfirty would be willing to 
enter the ARD program if a motion to nolle prosequi Miller's 
charges were granted.   
          Following the disposition of their criminal case, 
Hilfirty and Miller filed a civil complaint in federal district 
court against the following individuals:  LVAD Board member David 
C. Shipman; former LVAD Board member Betty Noll; Lycoming County 
Detective Kenneth R. Schriner; Lycoming County District Attorney 
Brett O. Feese; and Stephen C. Schopfer of the Lycoming County 
Solid Waste Department.  Plaintiffs' complaint contained five 
counts alleging, inter alia, a section 1983 claim based on 
alleged violations under the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments of their right to be free from malicious prosecution, 
their right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures, their 
right to their lawful interest in their property and their right 
not to be falsely arrested without due process of law.  Their 
complaint further alleged claims under section 1983 for 
conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, 
as well as claims under section 1986 for failure to prevent a 
conspiracy and pendent state claims for malicious prosecution and 
deprivation of life, liberty and property under the Constitution 
of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.   
     The five individual defendants in this action responded by 
filing motions to dismiss.  Defendants Shipman and Noll framed 
their motions to dismiss alternatively as motions for summary 
judgment.  The district court treated all five motions as motions 
for summary judgment because it accepted and considered material 
outside of the pleadings, specifically affidavits, in disposing 
of the motions.  It granted summary judgment to defendants on all 
federal claims and Miller's state malicious prosecution claim 
and dismissed the other pendent state claims without prejudice.  
     With the exception of plaintiffs' section 1983 claim of 
malicious prosecution, the district court found that all of 
plaintiffs' federal claims were time-barred because the statute 
of limitations had run.  With regard to the malicious prosecution 
claim, the district court found that neither Hilfirty nor Miller 
was able to meet the threshold requirement of demonstrating that 
the underlying proceeding terminated in his/her favor.  Hilfirty 
v. Shipman, No. 93-1497, slip op. at 16 (M.D. Pa. June 3, 1994) 
(hereinafter "Dist. Ct. Op.").   
     The only appellant in this matter is Martha Miller, who 
appeals to this court only from that portion of the district 
court's judgment regarding her claim for malicious prosecution.  
The only appellees here are Schriner, Feese and Schopfer.   
 
                               II. 
     The district court had jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1331 and 1343(3) & (4) and 42 U.S.C.  
1983.  This court exercises jurisdiction over this appeal of a 
final order of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.  1291.   
     Our review of the district court's order for summary 
judgment is plenary, and we thus apply the same standards that 
were applicable in the district court.  J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. 
Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1530 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.denied, 499 
U.S. 921 (1991).  Summary judgment is appropriately 
granted when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law."  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).  If, however, "the evidence is such 
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party," Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986), summary judgment shall not be granted.  Miller, as the 
nonmoving party, is entitled to have all reasonable inferences 
drawn in her favor.  See J.F. Feeser, 909 F.2d at 1531. 
 
                               III. 
     The district court issued summary judgment in favor of 
defendants on the malicious prosecution claim because it 
determined that Miller was unable to meet the threshold 
requirement of demonstrating that the criminal action "terminated 
in a manner 'consistent with innocence, such as acquittal or 
reversal of conviction.'" Dist. Ct. Op. at 16 (quoting Junod v. 
Bader, 458 A.2d 251, 253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (citing Anolik v. 
Marcovsky, 186 A. 418 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1936))).  Specifically, the 
district court concluded that the "nol prossing of charges as 
part of a plea bargain agreement [does not] equat[e] to the 
termination of the underlying proceedings in plaintiffs' favor."  
Dist. Ct. Op. at 19.  We are required to determine whether the 
district court was correct in its assessment that there was no 
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the underlying 
proceedings terminated in Miller's favor.     
                                A. 
     As an initial matter, we will assess whether the district 
court appropriately converted the 12(b)(6) motions filed by 
defendants into motions for summary judgment.  The district court 
explained that in reviewing the motions to dismiss, it accepted 
and considered four affidavits presented by defendants and the 
affidavit of Hilfirty, attached to plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law 
and Facts, and that accordingly, it considered all motions as 
motions for summary judgment.  Dist. Ct. Op. at 7 n.19.  Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) provides that if, on a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6),   
 
     matters outside the pleading are presented to and not 
     excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as 
     one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in 
     Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable 
     opportunity to present all material made pertinent to 
     such a motion by Rule 56. 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b).  Given that the district court accepted 
and considered documents outside of the pleadings in the course 
of disposing of defendants' motion, its treatment of these 
motions as motions for summary judgment was appropriate under the 
plain terms of the rule.  See 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur 
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure  1366 at 493 (West 1990) 
(noting that "[o]nce the court decides to accept matters outside 
the pleading, it must convert the motion to dismiss into one for 
summary judgment"). 
     Miller argues in her brief before this Court, however, that 
the "lower court's decision was pre-mature" [sic] and claims that 
"[d]iscovery should have been allowed."  Appellant's Brief at 11.  
Specifically, Miller contends that, had she had the opportunity 
to present the district court with more material regarding the 
circumstances under which the compromise was reached between the 
prosecution and Hilfirty, it would have been evident to the 
district court that she did not participate in the compromise and 
that, therefore, the court's grant of nolle prosequi should be 
considered to be a termination of the proceedings in her favor. 
     While she does not clearly define her argument as such, we 
interpret her claim to be that the district court erred in 
failing to provide notice that it was treating the motions to 
dismiss as motions for summary judgment and erred in failing to 
provide her an opportunity to submit material in support of her 
position.  It is, indeed, well-established that prior to 
converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary 
judgment, the district court must provide adequate notice to the 
parties.  Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 342 (3d Cir. 1989) ("We 
have held that it is reversible error for a district court to 
convert a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . into a motion for 
summary judgment unless the court provides notice of its 
intention to convert and allows an opportunity to submit 
materials admissible.") (and cases cited therein);  5A Wright & 
Miller, supra,  1366 at 501 ("It is important that the court 
give the parties notice of the changed status of the motion and a 
'reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to 
such a motion by Rule 56.'").  Certainly, the nonmoving party 
must have adequate notice and time to present to the district 
court material relevant to her claim in order to demonstrate that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact that renders summary 
disposition of the case inappropriate.    
     We find in the instant matter that Miller had adequate 
notice that the court would convert defendants' motions to 
dismiss into summary judgment motions, as well as adequate 
opportunity to respond.  The primary reason for our conclusion is 
that two of the five motions to dismiss were framed in the 
alternative as motions for summary judgment. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 
6.  This court has previously held that "[w]here a party has 
filed a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party is under 
an obligation to respond to that motion in a timely fashion and 
to place before the court all materials it wishes to have 
considered when the court rules on the motion."  Cowgill v. 
Raymark Industries, Inc., 780 F.2d 324, 329 (3d Cir. 1985).  That 
the two motions were framed only in the alternative as motions 
for summary judgment does not alter our conclusion.  Miller was 
on notice that the court was considering two motions for summary 
judgment, and she had the opportunity to respond over a period of 
nearly eight months, between the filing of the defendants' 
motions to dismiss in late October 1993 and the district court's 
final judgment in June of 1994.   Furthermore, neither Miller nor 
Hilfirty ever objected to defendants' submission of affidavits 
with their motions, nor did either Miller or Hilfirty make a 
motion for discovery before the court.  Rather, Hilfirty 
submitted his own affidavit with their brief before the court.  
Thus, it was appropriate for the district court to treat the 
motions as ones for summary judgment. 
                                B. 
     We will now assess the district court's conclusion that 
Miller failed to meet the threshold requirement for a claim for 
malicious prosecution. 
     In order to state a prima facie case for a section 1983 
claim of malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must establish the 
elements of the common law tort as it has developed over time.  
See Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1988); see alsoMcArdle v. 
Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1088 (3d Cir. 1992); 
Singleton v. City of New York, 632 F.2d 185, 195 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(collecting cases), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920 (1981).  In 
Pennsylvania, like most jurisdictions, a party bringing a 
malicious prosecution claim must demonstrate that (1) the 
defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal 
proceeding ended in the plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was 
initiated without probable cause; and (4) the defendants acted 
maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to 
justice. Haefner v. Burkey, 626 A.2d 519, 521 (Pa. 1993); seealso Lee, 847 
F.2d at 69-70. 
       The resolution of this case rests on an assessment of 
whether Miller is able to meet the second requirement, i.e. 
demonstrate that the criminal proceedings below ended in her 
favor.  According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts  659 
(1976), which has been relied upon by the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court, criminal proceedings are terminated in favor of the 
accused by 
     (a) a discharge by a magistrate at a preliminary 
     hearing, or  
     (b) the refusal of a grand jury to indict, or  
     (c) the formal abandonment of the proceedings by the 
     public prosecutor, or  
     (d) the quashing of an indictment or information, or 
     (e) an acquittal, or  
     (f) a final order in favor of the accused by a trial or 
     appellate court. 
Id., quoted in Haefner, 626 A.2d at 521.   
     Miller's basic argument is that the prosecution's decision 
to move for nolle prosequi of her charges amounts to a "formal 
abandonment of the proceedings by the public prosecutor," and 
thus the district court should have found that the criminal 
proceedings had terminated in her favor.  In particular, Miller 
refers us to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in 
Haefner, where the court determined that the plaintiff had met 
the threshold requirement for a malicious prosecution claim after 
the prosecution "nolle prossed the remaining charges because of 
insufficient evidence."  Haefner, 626 A.2d at 521.  The court 
there noted, "'if the defendant is discharged after abandonment 
of the charges by the prosecutor, this is sufficient to satisfy 
the requisite element of prior favorable termination of the 
criminal action.'"  Id. (quoting Woodyatt v. Bank of Old York 
Road, 182 A.2d 500, 501 (Pa. 1962)).   
     While Haefner clearly indicates that a grant of nolle 
prosequi can be sufficient to satisfy the favorable termination 
requirement for malicious prosecution, not all cases where the 
prosecutor abandons criminal charges are considered to have 
terminated favorably.  Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 
previously held that a prosecutor's decision to withdraw criminal 
charges pursuant to a compromise with the accused is not 
considered to be a termination sufficiently favorable to support 
a malicious prosecution claim.  See Alianell v. Hoffman, 176 A.2d 
207 (Pa. 1935).  Haefner, which did not involve a compromise 
agreement, did not disturb this holding.   
     It is indeed well-established at common law that   
     [a] termination of criminal proceedings in favor of the 
     accused other than by acquittal is not a sufficient 
     termination to meet the requirements of a cause of 
     action for malicious prosecution if 
 
     (a) the charge is withdrawn or the prosecution 
     abandoned pursuant to an agreement of compromise with 
     the accused . . . . 
 Restatement (Second) of Torts  660.  While the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court has never adopted this section of the Restatement, 
the Pennsylvania Superior Court has.  See Junod v. Bader, 458 
A.2d 251, 253-54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (finding that an ARD 
termination as a result of a compromise is not sufficient for 
meeting the threshold test for malicious prosecution and citing 
to section 660 of the Restatement).  Section 660(a) of the 
Restatement has also been adopted by a multitude of other state 
courts, see, e.g., Broaddus v. Campbell, 911 S.W. 2d 281, 284 
(Ky. Ct. App. 1995); Piper v. Scher, 533 A.2d 974, 976 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Joiner v. Benton Community Bank, 411 
N.E.2d 229, 232 (Ill. 1980);  Robinson v. Fimbel Door Company, 
306 A.2d 768, 770 (N.H. 1973), and at least two federal courts of 
appeals have accepted the general premise that dismissals 
resulting from a compromise with the prosecution are not 
"favorable terminations." See Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453, 456 
(5th Cir. 1994) (holding that dismissal of charges pursuant to a 
pre-trial diversion agreement with prosecutors is not termination 
of proceedings in favor of the accused to the extent that it will 
support a malicious prosecution claim); Singleton, 632 F.2d at 
194 (same). 
     The basic premise for this rule is that, unlike a situation 
where the prosecution seeks a grant of nolle prosequi "because of 
insufficient evidence," Haefner, 626 A.2d at 521, dismissal of 
charges as a result of a compromise is not an indication that the 
accused is actually innocent of the crimes charged.  SeeRestatement 
(Second) of Torts  660 cmt. c ("[T]he fact of a 
compromise indicates that the question of [the accused's] guilt 
or innocence is left open."); Davis v. Chubb/Pacific Indem. 
Group, 493 F. Supp. 89, 92 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (noting that entry 
into an ARD program is a compromise that leaves the question of 
guilt or innocence open).  Both the Restatement and case law 
suggest that only terminations that indicate that the accused is 
innocent ought to be considered favorable.  See Restatement 
(Second) of Torts  660 cmt. a ("Proceedings are 'terminated in 
favor of the accused' . . . only when their final disposition is 
such as to indicate the innocence of the accused."); Taylor, 36 
F.3d at 456 (noting that "proceedings are terminated in favor of 
the accused only when their final disposition indicates that the 
accused is not guilty") (citing Singleton, 632 F.2d at 193); 
Jaffe v. Stone, 114 P.2d 335, 338 (Cal. 1941) (holding that 
"[t]he theory underlying the requirement of favorable termination 
is that it tends to indicate the innocence of the accused"). 
     The district court relied upon this principle that the 
withdrawal of charges pursuant to a compromise is not a favorable 
termination in concluding that Miller was barred from filing a 
malicious prosecution claim.  The court considered the grant of 
nolle prosequi of Miller's charges to be the result of a 
compromise and thus concluded that the termination of the 
underlying proceedings was not sufficiently favorable to sustain 
Miller's malicious prosecution claim: 
     The Commonwealth's willingness to nol pros the charges 
     filed against [Miller] were conditioned on Hilfirty's 
     entry into the ARD program.  According to the 
     uncontradicted affidavits of prosecuting attorney 
     Ciampoli and First Assistant District Attorney Kenneth 
     A. Osokow, had Hilfirty not agreed to enter the ARD 
     program, the charges against Miller would not have been 
     dropped.  The quid pro quo demanded and received by the 
     Commonwealth deprives the nol pros of its effect and 
     indicates that the nol prossing of the charges against 
     Miller does not equate to, and cannot be considered as, 
     a termination in her favor sufficient to support an 
     action for malicious prosecution. 
Dist. Ct. Op. at 18-19.   
     However, that Miller was a beneficiary of Hilfirty's 
compromise agreement with the prosecution does not require a 
finding that she, herself, entered into a compromise.  The 
Restatement specifically contemplates that a termination is not 
sufficiently favorable to support a claim for malicious 
prosecution if "the charge is withdrawn . . . pursuant to an 
agreement of compromise with the accused."  Restatement (Second) 
of Torts,  660 (emphasis added).  An accused has entered into a 
compromise with the prosecution only if she herself offers 
something in return for the dismissal of her charges -- the 
equivalent of "consideration" in a contract arrangement.  This 
"consideration" could be, for example, entry into an ARD program 
such as that entered into by Hilfirty, or an agreement to pay 
restitution or return property to the victim.  This 
interpretation is consistent with the common understanding of a 
compromise, where both parties give something up in order to 
accommodate the agreement, as well as with case law in which 
compromises have been found to bar malicious prosecution claims.  
See, e.g., Alianell, 176 A.2d at 207 (finding malicious 
prosecution claim barred where the prosecution "agreed to 
withdraw the charges in consideration of a payment of $20 and the 
return of the goods in question"); Junod, 458 A.2d at 252-53 
(finding malicious prosecution claim barred because accused 
agreed to enter into ARD program and comply with its terms in 
exchange for dismissal of charges);  Taylor, 36 F.3d at 455-56 
(finding malicious prosecution claim barred because accused 
entered into pre-trial diversion agreement, thereby agreeing to 
enter into program of supervision); Singleton, 632 F.2d at 188, 
194 (finding malicious prosecution claim barred because accused 
consented to an adjournment in contemplation of dismissal, 
thereby agreeing to enter into a program "not unlike probation" 
where he is subject to the observation of the prosecution); 
Broaddus, 911 S.W.2d at 284 (finding malicious prosecution claim 
barred because "[t]he dismissal was not the unilateral act of the 
prosecutor; [the accused] gave up something to secure the 
dismissal of the charges"); but see Tucker v. Duncan, 499 F.2d 
963, 964 (4th Cir. 1974) (finding malicious prosecution claim 
barred simply because prosecution agreed to a nolle prosequi of 
accused's charges "after his attorney spoke with the prosecutor 
in a back room").   
     In the instant case, the compromise that occurred was not 
between Miller and the prosecution, but rather between Miller's 
co-defendant, Hilfirty, and the prosecution.  While Hilfirty 
offered the "quid pro quo" or "consideration" of entry into the 
ARD program in exchange for the prosecution not bringing him to 
trial and agreeing to move for nolle prosequi of Miller's 
charges, Miller herself offered no "consideration" or "quid pro 
quo" in exchange for the grant of nolle prosequi.  Thus, we do 
not find that she herself entered into any compromise with the 
prosecution indicating that the charges against her terminated 
favorably. 
     The district court, however, appears to have concluded that 
the nolle prosequi of Miller's charges was not a favorable 
termination because Miller was bound by Hilfirty's compromise.  
The district court treated Hilfirty's "quid pro quo" as though it 
were from Miller as well in finding that "[t]he quid pro quo 
demanded and received by the Commonwealth deprives the nol pros 
of its effect and indicates that the nol prossing of the charges 
against Miller does not equate to . . . a termination in her 
favor . . . ."  Dist. Ct. Op. at 19. 
     We thus are left to determine whether a compromise entered 
into by one party can bind that party's co-defendant such that 
the co-defendant is deprived of her ability to file a malicious 
prosecution claim.  This question has been answered affirmatively 
by one Pennsylvania Superior Court case, Georgiana v. United Mine 
Workers of America, International Union, 572 A.2d 232, 235 (Pa. 
Super. 1990).  Although the district court decision did not cite 
to Georgiana, we will discuss the case in some detail because of 
its similarities to the instant matter.  
     In Georgiana a woman and her husband were sued for fraud by 
the United Mine Workers.  Eventually, the woman entered into a 
settlement agreement pursuant to which the complaint against her 
and her husband was dropped.  Id. at 233.  The husband later 
filed a claim for malicious use of civil process against the 
United Mine Workers, but the trial court granted a demurrer on 
the ground that the settlement agreement was effective against 
both him and his wife and the underlying proceedings thus had not 
terminated in the husband's favor.  Id.  On appeal, the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed:  "We cannot agree that the 
unilateral action of one party in negotiating a settlement 
necessarily binds another party who did not participate in that 
settlement, simply because the parties are named defendants in 
the same suit."  Id. at 235 (emphasis added).  However, the court 
did allow that "the fact-finder could determine that, even though 
appellant himself did not negotiate the settlement, his wife 
acted on his behalf in order to prevent an inquiry into her 
husband's conduct."  Id.  In support of its conclusion, the court 
cited to Comment b of  660(a) in the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, which reads as follows: 
     There are two factors common to [indecisive 
     terminations not considered favorable for purposes of 
     malicious prosecution]:  First, the charge is withdrawn 
     for a cause not incompatible with the guilt of the 
     accused or the possibility of obtaining his conviction; 
     second, the withdrawal is at the request or with the 
     consent of the accused or is due to something done by 
     him or on his behalf for the purpose of preventing a 
     full and fair inquiry into his guilt or innocence. 
Id. (emphasis added).  The court thus remanded the matter so that 
a fact-finder could determine whether the wife's settlement of 
the action should bind her husband, based upon "the particular 
circumstances surrounding [the] settlement, and not upon the 
status of the parties."  Id. 
     While our research has revealed no other case from 
Pennsylvania or any other jurisdiction in which a court has 
concluded that there may be circumstances in which one party's 
settlement agreement may bind another, we nonetheless predict 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would adopt Georgiana's 
fundamental holding.  See Kiewet Eastern Co., Inc. v. L & R 
Const. Co., Inc., 44 F.3d 1194, 1201 n.16 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(explaining that, when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has not 
spoken on an issue, we look to the decisions of the intermediate 
Pennsylvania courts).  We find no indication in any other 
Pennsylvania case law that Georgiana would not be followed. SeeWisniewski 
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 759 F.2d 271, 273-74 (3d Cir. 
1985) ("Although lower state court decisions are not controlling 
on an issue on which the highest court of the state has spoken, 
federal courts must attribute significant weight to these 
decisions in the absence of any indication that the highest state 
court would rule otherwise.").  
     Having determined that we will follow Georgiana's basic  
holding, we still are left to enumerate the specific findings 
that a trial court is required to make in order to conclude that 
one party is bound by the settlement agreement of her co- 
defendant such that she is barred from bringing a malicious 
prosecution claim.  Georgiana makes clear only that this 
determination is to be based upon "the particular circumstances 
surrounding [the] settlement, and not upon the status of the 
parties."  Georgiana, 572 A.2d at 235.  It provides us with no 
other guidance, however, and we are left to rely upon policy 
considerations in making this determination.       
     As a threshold matter, we can envision no scenario in which 
it would be appropriate for a co-defendant to enter into a 
settlement agreement on behalf of another party without that 
party's consent.  The contents of a settlement agreement may have 
profound effects upon an individual's life.  Accordingly, we find 
that a court may determine under Georgiana that a party is bound 
by her co-defendant's settlement agreement only if it finds that 
the party has knowingly authorized her co-defendant to serve as 
her agent in entering the agreement.     
     We further think that policy considerations suggest that a 
court may conclude that a party is bound by her co-defendant's 
settlement agreement only if it finds that she fully understands 
the consequences of her consent.  A court certainly would not 
accept a plea bargain from a criminal defendant absent a 
statement from that defendant that he fully understands the terms 
of the agreement and the consequences of entering the plea.  
While we recognize that the repercussions of allowing a criminal 
defendant to enter a guilty plea, perhaps accepting jail time 
without fully understanding the consequences of his actions, are 
undoubtedly greater than those of allowing an accused to 
relinquish her right to file a malicious prosecution claim, it is 
nonetheless our view that a maliciously prosecuted individual's 
right to file a civil action is of significant importance; we are 
thus loath to allow for a situation where such a right is 
unknowingly relinquished.   
     It is, indeed, easy to envision a scenario where such could 
occur.  For example, a wife might agree to allow her husband to 
represent both of them in negotiations with the prosecution, 
knowing that she is completely innocent of all alleged charges 
and fully expecting that her husband will be able to obtain a 
dismissal of all charges against her.  Assuming her husband 
succeeds in accomplishing this in the course of negotiating his 
own compromise, she would most likely presume that she had been 
exonerated of all wrongdoing and would expect that she would be 
able to pursue a malicious prosecution claim.  She would have 
given up nothing in exchange for the dismissal; no consideration 
would have been offered that would leave her innocence in doubt 
and she would have every reason to believe that her proceedings 
had terminated favorably.  Yet, if Georgiana were interpreted to 
allow the husband's compromise to bind his wife without requiring 
any inquiry into her understanding of the consequences of the 
agreement, she would be unable to vindicate her right to be free 
from malicious prosecution. 
     Such an outcome is highly undesirable and can be avoided.  
We thus conclude that, when a co-defendant acting as an 
authorized agent of another party, say his wife, enters into a 
compromise that provides for the dismissal of charges against 
her, she cannot be barred from filing a malicious prosecution 
claim if she herself offered no consideration in exchange for the 
dismissal, unless it is clear that she was fully aware that such 
waiver would be the consequence of allowing her husband to enter 
into the compromise on her behalf.   
     These two determinations -- whether a party (1) consented to 
allow her co-defendant to enter an agreement on her behalf, and 
(2) whether she was fully aware that by allowing her co-defendant 
to enter the agreement she would be barred from filing a 
malicious prosecution claim -- are fact questions.  We believe, 
however, that policy considerations suggest that a jury not be 
left to make this all-important state-of-mind determination by 
merely piecing together snippets of evidence regarding the nature 
of the settlement agreement.  As noted above, we believe that the 
right to file a malicious prosecution claim is a deeply important 
one.  Persons who are unjustly prosecuted may suffer emotional 
pain, permanent damage to their reputation and real financial 
costs.  Furthermore, it is in the public interest to ensure that 
persons against whom prosecutions are maliciously filed are 
provided an opportunity to recover civil damages; such actions 
protect those persons wrongly prosecuted and deter malicious 
prosecutions, thereby lending legitimacy to the institution of 
criminal prosecution.   
     In order to ensure that no person who may have been subject 
to malicious prosecution inadvertently or unintentionally waives 
the right to pursue such claim, we conclude that, in instances 
where a party authorizes her co-defendant to enter into a 
compromise agreement providing for the dismissal of her criminal 
charges and she offers no consideration in exchange for such 
dismissal, she will not have been found to have relinquished her 
right to file a malicious prosecution claim unless it is plain 
from the record of a hearing in open court or a written release- 
dismissal agreement that such relinquishment was knowing, 
intentional and voluntary.     
     While we recognize that this requirement is not specifically 
suggested by the language of Georgiana, we think that it is a 
highly sensible requirement and an outgrowth of that opinion.  
First, and most importantly, it ensures that individuals 
consciously consider their options and understand the 
consequences of their actions before waiving their civil rights.  
Second, it provides for a bright-line rule, avoiding the need for 
extensive fact-finding on the part of a jury; either a defendant 
has agreed to relinquish her rights or she has not.  Third, it 
ensures a meeting of the minds between the prosecution and an 
accused.  If, for example, the prosecution affirmatively seeks to 
require an accused to relinquish her right to file a civil claim 
when dismissing the charges against her, such an intention will 
be plain from the face of the court record or the release- 
dismissal agreement.  Finally, such a requirement imposes no cost 
or undue burden on the prosecution.  Rather, it precludes the 
need for lengthy inquiries into state of mind or the significance 
of a dismissal of charges.  Indeed, it may well be that such a 
requirement will limit the number of malicious prosecution cases. 
     We take care to note that any such in-court waiver or 
release-dismissal agreement will be valid only if it is 
voluntary; there is no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct; and 
the agreement is not offensive to the relevant public interest.  
See Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 1993) (in 
banc) (citing Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 398 
(1987)).  This three-pronged test will ensure that prosecutors do 
not deliberately seek to avoid liability for themselves or others 
who wrongfully initiated such proceedings by forcing individuals 
into a waiver or signing of these agreements.  In addition, the 
test prevents prosecutors from adopting a blanket policy of 
routinely obtaining in-court waivers or release-dismissal 
agreements every time they agree to dismiss the charges against 
one defendant in the course of agreeing to a compromise with a 
co-defendant; instead, they must make their determinations about 
whether to seek a waiver or release-dismissal agreement on a 
case-by-case basis.  See id. at 382.   
     In light of the above analysis, we find that the district 
court erred in concluding that Miller could be bound by a 
compromise entered into by her husband such that she was 
precluded from filing a malicious prosecution claim.  Even if 
defendants' representation that Miller herself sought or accepted 
the grant of nolle prosequi were true -- facts which are not 
necessarily indicated by the record -- there is no indication in 
the form of a release-dismissal agreement with the prosecution or 
a record of a hearing in open court indicating that she knew that 
her acceptance of the grant of nolle prosequi, for which she 
offered no consideration, would deprive her of her ability to 
file a malicious prosecution claim.  In the absence of a release- 
dismissal agreement or a waiver reflected in a court record 
coupled with our earlier conclusion that the grant of nolle 
prosequi was not the result of a compromise between Miller 
herself and the prosecution, we conclude that this case is 
governed by Haefner, 626 A.2d at 521, and that the grant of nolle 
prosequi is "sufficient to satisfy the requisite element of prior 
favorable termination of the criminal action."  Id. (citation 
omitted).  Accordingly, Miller may pursue her claim for malicious 
prosecution.  
 
                               IV. 
     For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court's 
grant of summary judgment regarding Miller's ability to 
demonstrate the favorable termination of her underlying criminal 
proceedings, and we remand this matter to the district court for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
                           
Hilfirty v. Shipman, No. 95-7206 
 
 
POLLAK, District Judge, concurring: 
 
     In Georgiana v. UMW, 572 A.2d 232 (Pa. Super. 1990), the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court rejected the proposition "that the 
unilateral action of one party in negotiating a settlement 
necessarily binds another party who did not participate in that 
settlement. . . ."  Id. at 235.   Today, this court, in an 
opinion which I join, holds "that, in instances where a party 
authorizes her co-defendant to enter into a compromise agreement 
providing for the dismissal of her criminal charges and she 
offers no consideration in exchange for such dismissal, she will 
not have been found to have relinquished her right to file a 
malicious prosecution claim unless it is plain from the record of 
a hearing in open court or a written release-dismissal agreement 
that such relinquishment was knowing, intentional and voluntary."  
Typescript, supra, p. 26.  This holding -- which comports with 
the test generally applicable to waivers of civil rights claims, 
see W. B. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 497 (3d Cir. 1995), Cain v. Darby 
Borough, 7 F.3d 377, 380 (3d Cir. 1993) (in banc) -- is 
characterized as an "outgrowth" of Georgiana.  Typescript, supra, 
p. 26. 
     While I accept this court's hospitable reading of Georgiana, 
and agree that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, when it has 
occasion to address the issue, is likely to adopt Georgiana's 
"fundamental holding," Typescript, supra p. 22, I add these 
concurring words to make the point that, in the case at bar, even 
under a narrower reading of Georgiana, a grant of summary 
judgment against Miller was not warranted. 
     The narrower reading of Georgiana would place particular 
weight on the Superior Court's statement "that the question 
whether one defendant's settlement of an action should bind 
another defendant must depend on the particular circumstances 
surrounding that settlement . . . ."  572 A.2d at 235.  That 
statement follows the Georgiana court's discussion of section 660 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the section which is 
Georgiana's analytic bedrock.  That section, captioned 
"Indecisive Termination of Proceedings," provides as follows: 
     A termination of criminal proceedings in favor of the 
     accused other than by acquittal is not a sufficient 
     termination to meet the requirements of a cause of 
     action for malicious prosecution if 
 
        (a) the charge is withdrawn or the prosecution 
     abandoned pursuant to an agreement of compromise with 
     the accused; or 
 
        (b) the charge is withdrawn or the prosecution 
     abandoned because of misconduct on the part of the 
     accused or in his behalf for the purpose of preventing 
     proper trial; or  
 
        (c) the charge is withdrawn or the proceeding 
     abandoned out of mercy requested or accepted by the 
     accused; or 
 
        (d) new proceedings for the same offense have been 
     properly instituted and have not been terminated in 
     favor of the accused. 
 
Restatement (Second) of Torts 660 (1977). 
     Plainly, the "termination of criminal proceedings in favor 
of" Miller is not covered by clause (b): i.e., there is no hint 
that the charges against Miller were withdrawn "because of 
misconduct . . . for the purpose of preventing proper trial."  
Nor is there any suggestion that either clause (c), relating to 
"abandon[ment] out of mercy," or clause (d), relating to the 
institution of new proceedings, had application to Miller. 
     The only aspect of section 660 that might be inquired into 
is clause (a), relating to withdrawal of charges "pursuant to an 
agreement of compromise with the accused."  On the record made 
below, evidence that Miller entered into an "agreement of 
compromise" is extremely tenuous.  To be sure, it has been 
averred that Miller's attorney was present at discussions with 
the assistant district attorney and with Hilfirty's attorney.  
The assistant district attorney characterized the result of these 
discussions as a "joint agreement," under which "the Commonwealth 
agreed to recommend the ARD program for Mr. Hilfirty and to nolle 
pros the charges against Ms. Miller."  Ciampoli Affidavit,  6, 
Appellees' Appendix at 2.  But there is no suggestion that 
Miller, via her attorney or otherwise, took any sort of active 
role in these discussions.  To the contrary, it would appear that 
it was Hilfirty's attorney who, on his client's behalf, entered 
into a bargain with the Commonwealth Ä namely, that Hilfirty 
would enter the ARD program and the Commonwealth would drop the 
charges against Miller.  Moreover, according to the assistant 
district attorney, "the Commonwealth would not have agreed to 
dismiss the charges against Miller if Hilfirty had not agreed to 
the ARD program."  Id.  In other words, it appears that the 
Commonwealth included Miller in the "joint agreement" as an 
inducement to Hilfirty to accept ARD. 
     One who acquiesces in an arrangement under which she 
surrenders nothing does not thereby accept a "compromise," at 
least not in the sense in which the Restatement means that word.  
Comment c to section 660 of the Restatement provides an 
illuminating explanation of the rationale for section 660(a)'s 
rule that a prosecution that terminates with an agreement of 
compromise does not terminate favorably.  It states:  "Although 
the accused by his acceptance of a compromise does not admit his 
guilt, the fact of compromise indicates that the question of his 
guilt or innocence is left open.  Having bought peace the accused 
may not thereafter assert that the proceedings have terminated in 
his favor."  Restatement (Second) of Torts  660 cmt. c (1977).  
In this case, the most that can be said is that Miller acquiesced 
in a compromise structured by the Commonwealth and Hilfirty.  
Since there is no evidence that Miller made any affirmative 
effort whatsoever to seek out a compromise, she can hardly be 
thought to have "bought peace."  In short, the circumstances of 
the dismissal of the case against Miller in no way call into 
question the favorable nature of the termination of Miller's 
prosecution. 
     Thus, even if the Pennsylvania Supreme Court were to build 
on Georgiana more narrowly than we do -- even if, for example, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court were to conclude that a dismissal 
of criminal charges which was negotiated by a co-defendant might 
in certain "particular circumstances" bar a suit for malicious 
prosecution notwithstanding that the would-be plaintiff had not 
executed a written release-dismissal agreement or stated in open 
court her intention to relinquish her potential claim -- the 
particular "particular circumstances" presented on this appeal 
are not of a sort that could properly operate to bar Miller's 
suit. 
_____________________________________________________ 
